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THE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION
DISTINCTION: A USEFUL FICTION
Laura A. Cisneros*
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, theories of constitutional interpretation
have experienced a sea change. Some scholars have claimed that
the old debate between originalism and nonoriginalism has gone
by the wayside and that it is less accurate nowadays to describe
the differences between these theories of American
constitutional interpretation in terms of originalism and “non”
1
anything. Others have suggested that the differences are better
conceived of in terms of variations within the originalism family.
For example, Jeffrey Rosen in 1997 exclaimed, “We are all
2
originalists now.” More recently, that notion was repeated by
3
some in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in District of
4
5
Columbia v. Heller. Even so, not all agree.
* Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. LL.M.,
University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D., Loyola University New Orleans School of
Law. Thank you to the Section on Constitutional Law for their invitation to contribute to
the panel, “The Interpretation—Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law,” at the
2010 AALS Annual Meeting. I would also like to thank the panel participants and
attendees for an engaging and memorable experience. I am particularly grateful to
Golden Gate University School of Law for its summer grant program and general
support of my scholarship. Thank you also to my former colleagues at Thurgood
Marshall School of Law for their encouragement and support.
1. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1194
(2008) (noting that since the 1990’s the legal academy has generally accepted that the
alternative to “originalism” is “not ‘non’ anything, but rather the conventional,
historically grounded, traditions of constitutional interpretation”).
2. Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia, and its
Intellectual Incoherence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26 (book review) (“Most judges
and legal scholars who want to remain within the boundaries of respectable
constitutional discourse agree that the original meaning of the Constitution and its
amendments has some degree of pertinence to the question of what the Constitution
means today.”).
3. See, e.g., Dave Kopel, Conservative Activists Key to DC Handgun Decision,
HUMAN EVENTS (June 27, 2008), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27229 (In
Heller, “The Scalia majority and Stevens dissent are both argued mostly in terms of
original meaning and textualism. Both Scalia and Stevens delve very deeply into 18th and

71
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Ultimately,
differences
between
originalism
and
6
nonoriginalism remain. In fact, not only are there a wide range
7
of alternatives to originalism, there are a number of variations

19th century sources on the meaning of words, and the original public understanding of
the Second Amendment. At least in terms of the Second Amendment, we are all
originalists now.”); see also Dahlia Lithwick, The Dark Matter of Our Cherished
Document: What You See in the Constitution Isn’t What You Get, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2008,
2:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2204377/ (book review) (“The liberals and
conservatives [in Heller] took turns trying to outdo one another as ‘textualists’ and
‘originalists’ and ‘strict constructionists.’”).
4. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 2821–22 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms and although that right was not
unlimited, the District of Columbia’s statutory ban on handgun possession in the home
and its requirement that all firearms in the household be kept in a manner that prevented
their immediate use for self-defense violated the Second Amendment).
5. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Heller High Water?: The Future of Originalism, 3
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 326 (2009) (arguing against the “we are all originalists”
claim, stating “Not only are we not all originalists now, but very few of us are originalists
now.”) (emphasis in original); see also Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism:
Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246–48 (2008) (arguing that the most
plausible explanation for the Court’s decision in Heller is rooted in the idea of living
constitutionalism, not originalism. Professor Sunstein claims that Heller is more closely
related to Griswold v. Connecticut—where the Court struck down Connecticut’s ban on
the use of contraceptives by married couples—because both “narrow rulings with strong
minimalist features,” are best explained as responsive to national consensus and
contemporary values “notwithstanding the Court’s preoccupation [in Heller] with
constitutional text and history”). For additional analyses of Heller as an example of living
constitutionalism, see Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009).
6. Although (as noted above) some have suggested that the alternative to
originalism is not “non” anything, for purposes of clarity, this article uses the term
“nonoriginalism” or “nonoriginalist” to represent the diversity of alternative approaches
to originalism.
7. A full discussion of these alternative approaches to constitutional interpretation
is beyond the scope of this article. But see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 557 (2009) (arguing that living
constitutionalism is harmonious with what he defines as “framework originalism”); Jack
M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007)
[hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning]; Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional
Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional
Redemption] (presenting a “theory of text and principle” which he defines as
“redemptive constitutionalism”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (1987);
Howard Gillman, Political Development and the Origins of the Living Constitution
(Digital Commons, Paper 53, 2006), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.
edu/schmooze_papers/53; Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes
in a Dead Constitution, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2005, 5:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2125226/ (“We are all living constitutionalists now.”). For a theory that holds that
extraordinary popular mobilizations have revised the Constitution’s commands from
time to time see Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737
(2007). For a discussion describing constitutional change through popular mobilization
and other varieties of living constitutionalism see Larry D. Kramer, Popular
Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 967–74 (2004).
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8

within originalism itself. New Originalism has emerged as one
such variation. One of the fundamental distinctions between Old
and New Originalism is that the former tended to focus on the
original intentions of the authors of a particular legal text
whereas the latter tends to focus on the “original public
meaning” of the particular legal text, which is the meaning that
the intended audience would have assigned to a given word,
9
phrase, or sentence at the time it was drafted. The full contours
of New Originalism as distinguished from Old Originalism are
beyond the scope of this paper. Generally speaking, however,
New Originalism explains the theory of American constitutional
interpretation as something of a dual process: First, one must
look to the original public meaning (interpretation) and when
that runs out, look to other sources that might reliably fill out
the contours of that interpretation (e.g., history and tradition
surrounding the text, the structure of the text, court precedent,
10
etc). The second part of this process is what is often referred to
as “construction.”
This is unobjectionable so far as it goes. It suggests that the
break from Old to New Originalism was something of a natural
development. Think about it: the originalism that thrived in the
1960s through the mid-1980s concentrated on (at least) two
commitments: (1) pushing against the doctrinal developments of
the Warren Court and (2) constraining judicial activity by
11
limiting judicial discretion. By the early 1990s, the transition
from the Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court made the judicial
opinions that old originalists were railing against less frequent,
8. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
26 (2001) (“Originalism comes in a bewildering variety of colors and flavors.”); Mitchell
N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2009) (“[L]iterally
thousands of discrete theses can plausibly claim to be originalist”); Martin S. Flaherty,
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812 (1996) (“If ever a term muddied
as much as it clarified, ‘originalism’ is it.”).
9. For a discussion of original meaning, original intent, and original public
meaning see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926–33 (2009).
10. For more in-depth discussions about the specifics and developments contained
in New Originalism, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION]; KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION];
Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 7; Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 7.
11. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 690 (2005) (“The old originalism was
designed to promote judicial restraint and criticize the judicial innovations of liberal
judges in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s.”).
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thereby making these two commitments less necessary. What
surfaced afterward and replaced the commitment to subverting
“activist” theory (and practice) was a need to develop a positive
constitutional doctrine that was (1) based on the text of the
Constitution and (2) capable of guiding the actual activities of
federal judges. Indeed, as conservatives came to dominate the
Supreme Court, originalism needed to provide a workable
theoretical foundation to support majority opinions, i.e., create a
constructive governing philosophy. To a large extent, I think
New Originalism in general, and the constitutional
interpretation/construction debate in particular is responding
well to that call. However, it is hardly an effort without strife,
both internal and external. Even among New Originalists, the
debate over where interpretation ends and where construction
begins is contested, as is the battle over whether the judiciary
plays a dominant role or subservient role in the construction
effort.
The source of the conflict, ironically enough, is located in a
theoretical position that nearly all New Originalists share—
namely, that constitutional interpretation requires some degree
of judgment. The interpretation/construction distinction admits
that at a certain point interpretation (original public meaning)
exhausts itself and can no longer provide the linguistic cues
necessary to explain the text or guide our application of it, and
that when original public meaning runs out, constitutional
meaning must be constructed through the exercise of judgment.
Recent work discussing the distinction displays a range of
attitudes with respect to who gets to make the judgment and the
form that judgment should take. Some writers have expanded
the debate beyond the originally offered definitions for
“interpretation” and “construction” and argue that
“construction” has little to do with finding textual meaning at all,
but rather is related solely to the implementation of policy and
constitutional decisions—i.e., a purely political activity. Others
have asserted that the distinction between interpretation and
construction does not capture a real difference—that the two

12. For an analysis of the Rehnquist Court focusing on its pro-state power
federalism opinions, opinions overturning affirmative action programs, and opinions
reversing liberal precedents on criminal procedure, see THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST
ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM 2 (2004) (“Judicial conservatism born in reaction to the liberal judicial
activism of the Warren Court has come to create not judicial restraint but instead its own
version of judicial activism.”).
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activities are so intertwined as to be inseparable, that they are
connected phases of a single task. As I will discuss below, I tend
to pitch my tent in the second camp and view the line between
interpretation and construction as artificial, as it defies all
practical attempts to draw it consistently from case to case. No
one has developed a formula for predictably discerning between
the two activities and it is doubtful that such a formula, if
devised and presented, would win more than minority support
among constitutional scholars.
Nevertheless, I think the distinction is important, in that it
reminds theorists of the dual nature of constitutional
interpretation—between what the Constitution means and how
the Constitution can be implemented. This is a distinction which
should not be overlooked or conflated. Ultimately, the
distinction may only prove useful in trying to figure out what the
Court is doing rather than trying to figure out what the Court
should do. Still, by incorporating actual judicial activity into the
theoretical discussion of American constitutional interpretation,
the
interpretation/construction
distinction
appropriately
highlights two key areas for further analysis: how to determine
what the Constitution means (i.e., document fidelity) and how a
particular institutional actor can implement that meaning (i.e.,
institutional obligation). Against this backdrop, this Article
argues that the constitutional interpretation/construction
distinction is a fiction, but a useful one in constitutional law.
Part I briefly describes the interpretation/construction
13
distinction as an artificial construct—a fiction. The many
commentaries on the subject encompass such a wide range of
positions that the distinction, to the extent it truly exists at all,
does so in the eye of each individual beholder. In Part II, I argue
that the distinction, even if understood as a fiction, is
nevertheless relevant because it can be used to bridge the
expanse between originalist and nonoriginalist (or, if one
prefers, between “strong” and “weak” originalist) theories of
American constitutional interpretation. Put another way, the
fiction is useful. In Part III then, I turn to the idea of usefulness.
Focusing on how the distinction may be relevant, I suggest that
maintaining a distinction between interpretation and
construction is ultimately positive because it offers a new
language system in which to continue a more meaningful debate
13. For a discussion of the use of the word “fiction,” see infra notes 23–28 and
accompanying text.
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between different interpretive theories. In other words, the
appeal of the distinction is its ability to move constitutional
commentary away from ideological entrenchment to a more
meaningful discussion about both the process and substance of
constitutional adjudication.
I. THE INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION
DISTINCTION AS FICTION
In the 1990s, some constitutional theorists began to craft a
distinction
between
constitutional
interpretation
and
constitutional construction, and this work has received renewed
interest of late, although even those who claim to see this
distinction disagree on exactly what it is. Some frame the
distinction as a bright line between two distinct activities. Larry
Solum, for example, defines the distinction as follows:
“Interpretation is the activity that aims to recover the linguistic
meaning (or semantic content) of a legal text. Construction is the
activity that aims to produce juridical meaning (or legal content)
14
that is authorized by a legal text.” Thus, for Solum,
interpretation is a kind of archaeology in which the meaning of
the words and phrases of the Constitution is determined through
a close reading of the text, which itself is informed by a strong
knowledge of the language as it was used at the time of
composition. Construction, by contrast, is something altogether
different. In Solum’s view, construction is what happens when
judicial and non-judicial actors take the product of the
interpretation enterprise—i.e., the recovered meaning of the
text—and then implement that meaning through legal rules that
govern everyday social and political life. Note also that, for
Solum, judges are intimately involved in the construction effort.
Keith Whittington also presents interpretation and construction as two distinct activities, but he divides up the tasks a
little differently. His early work drew a sharp line between the
two activities and argued that courts were principally responsible
for and should be limited to interpretation, while the political
14. Professor Solum articulated this most recent iteration of the
interpretation/construction distinction. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 9, at 973 (providing an
expanded definition of “construction” as “the activity of translating the semantic content
of a legal text into legal rules, paradigmatically in cases where the meaning of the text is
vague”); Lawrence Solum, Graber on the Interpretation-Construction Distinction at the
AALS, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 13, 2010, 4:19 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2010/01/graber-on-the-interpretationconstruction-distinction-panel-at-theaals.html.
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branches were principally responsible for and should direct
15
constitutional construction. Whittington’s later work eased up
on the force of this initial argument. He now acknowledges that
courts have a role to play in constitutional construction, but that
the supremacy of those judicial constructions are ultimately
permitted to exist through the grace of the political branches
who use judicial construction as a mechanism for political
16
advantage. For example, if political actors want “cover” on an
unpopular issue, they can express their personal view on the
issue itself, while maintaining their commitment to enforce the
decisions of the Court as the law of the land. The abortion
debate is a ready example. As the Court placed abortion on the
national agenda amid polarization among the Democratic Party,
then-President Jimmy Carter could not take a clear position on
the issue without marginalizing part of the Democratic Party.
Whittington discusses how President Carter, whose own
“conservative and evangelical characteristics appealed to pro-life
voters” deferred to the Court when asked in 1980 how he could
17
“support abortion.” Nevertheless, Whittington’s basic position
has not changed. He still places primacy of constitutional
construction in the hands of the political branches. Judicial
participation in the construction phase should occur only when it
serves the interests of the political branches.
Others retain the dual framework, but adjust the line
between the two. Mitch Berman expands Solum’s definition of
“interpretation” to include other modalities, not just semantic or
18
linguistic content that point to “what the law is.” Still others
argue that a variety of possible interpretation/construction
distinctions exist, but that each depends on the nature of the
problem being addressed. In a thoughtful and thought-provoking
post, Mark Graber conceptualizes various types of

15. See WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 10; WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 10.
16. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(2007).
17. Id. at 66–68.
18. Mitchell, N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision
Rules: Further Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
39, 45 (2010). For a discussion of these “other modalities” see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT,
FATE] (discussing a modal theory of the Constitution, which conceives of six valid forms
or “modalities” of constitutional argument: historical, textual, doctrinal, structural,
prudential, and ethical). See also PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (elaborating on the
modal theory from Constitutional Fate).

!!!CISNEROS-271-CONSTITUTIONALINTGERPRETATIONCONSTRUCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:51 AM

78

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 27:71

interpretation/construction distinctions formed around various
problems. Among other things, Graber posits one can express
the interpretation/construction distinction in terms of certainty:
interpretation takes place when the meaning of the Constitution
is clear or when the interpreter claims to have found an objective
“right” answer to what the particular constitutional provision
means. On the other hand, construction takes place when the
meaning of the particular constitutional provision is contested or
the answer is not objectively correct. Another possible
distinction is one addressing meaning or methods. In that
instance, interpretation describes the activity of looking for the
original public meaning of the Constitution while construction
describes all other forms of constitutional analysis. Still another
distinction between the two can be offered to explain the
difference between meaning and implementation: interpretation
occurs when we look for the meaning of the Constitution while
construction occurs when we “operationalize that meaning into
19
principles of constitutional law.”
On the opposite end of the spectrum, are those that do not
see a line at all. For example, Rick Hills argues that the two
activities cannot easily be separated, “pragmatically speaking,
the meaning of a constitutional provision is its
20
implementation.” Although here Hills frames his comments in
terms of “implementation” rather than “construction,” the two
operate as functional equivalents. Indeed, Hills’ work in this
area develops and extends Richard Fallon’s work focusing on
the rules courts develop to “implement” constitutional
commands. Fallon defines “implementation” in terms that are
strikingly similar to the current understanding of the
21
“construction” prong of the distinction. Fallon’s 2001 book
took a macro-level perspective to discussing doctrinal
developments. In particular, Fallon discussed the Court’s
necessity of rules-construction based on constitutional meaning
to decide particular cases. He argued that the majority of the
19. Mark Graber, The Interpretation/Construction Distinctions, BALKINIZATION
BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:41 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/01/much-constitutionaltheory-over-past.html.
20. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006) (emphasis in original).
21. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001) (“The
term implementation invites recognition that the function of putting the Constitution
effectively into practice is a necessarily collaborative one, which often requires
compromise and accommodation. It also emphasizes the practical, frequently strategic
aspects of the Court’s work [including] the formulation of constitutional rules, formulas,
and tests.”).
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time the Court was not choosing between originalist and
nonoriginalist theories, but instead was simply applying or
adjusting rules from precedent cases to meet new
22
circumstances.
The disagreement over whether and where to draw the line
dividing interpretation from construction suggests that the point
of distinction between the two cannot be fixed by the
unwavering certitude of “fact” but may be shaped instead by the
fluid inventiveness of “fiction.” Here, I am indebted to and tend
to share Lewis H. LaRue’s explanation and use of the word
“fiction” in his 1995 work Constitutional Law as Fiction:
23
Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority. LaRue states:
The title of this book, Constitutional Law as Fiction,
summarizes my thesis, which is that the proud towers of the
law are built not on the level bedrock of “fact” but on the
perplexed terrain of “fiction,” that judicial opinions are filled
with “stories” that purport to be “factual” but that instead are
“fictional,” and furthermore, that these “fictions” could not
24
be eliminated without crippling the legal enterprise.

LaRue’s essential claim is that “legal discourse is made of
25
stories that are ‘fictional.’” He roots the power of the judicial
enterprise in the persuasiveness of the judicial opinion and
asserts that “[w]ithout persuasion, law could not be law, and
26
without fiction, there would be no persuasion.” Still, he is
careful to qualify his use of the metaphor “law as fiction” as
descriptive rather than evaluative and as only one alternative
way in which to describe the law, acknowledging neither that his

22. Id. at 5 (“Especially in formulating tests such as these, the Court does not
characteristically engage in historical or moral analysis, nor does it attempt to determine
whether particular events in the world come within the semantic meaning of a
constitutional norm. Rather, the Court devises and implements strategies for enforcing
constitutional values.”); see also id. at 76–101 (outlining and analyzing “seven kinds of
tests that the Court frequently employs in enforcing constitutional guarantees of
individual rights”).
23. LEWIS H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE
RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995). For literature that explores the connection between
storytelling and legal argument, see LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN
THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul D. Gewirtz eds., 1996). For work applying narrative
theory to law, see John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A
Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 608–13 (2005); Eleanor Swift, Narrative
Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 975, 980 n.17 (2008).
24. LARUE, supra note 23, at 8.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 11.
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description is (or should be) the predominant one nor that his
27
description necessarily or logically excludes any other.
The American Heritage Dictionary lists, among others, the
following definitions for fiction: “1a. An imaginative creation or
a pretense that does not represent actuality but has been
invented. . . . 2. A lie. . . . 4. Law Something untrue that is
28
intentionally represented as true by the narrator.” My use of
the word is not in any pejorative sense. I do not mean to imply
that the use of fiction in the law (whether in a judicial opinion or
in an academic article) is driven by malice or the desire to
mislead. I think that the idea of fiction is more complex than
that. To be sure, any attempt to explain the course of events
(e.g., a statement of facts in a brief or a factual recitation in a
judicial opinion), opens up the possibility that the factual basis
on which those statements or recitals rely are either incomplete
29
or contain ambiguities. What this means then is that a certain
amount of the creative, inventive, imaginative process must be
used to resolve these ambiguities or fill-in an incomplete record.
Ultimately, debate over the precise contours of
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction
leaves us with a distinction that is neither obvious nor
identifiable through the application of an accepted and uniform
set of rules. One need only ask two of the five theorists discussed
above (say, Solum and Graber) to read a Supreme Court
opinion and they may be hard-pressed to agree as to the point at
which the Court stopped interpreting and started constructing.
Thus, as an aid to the practice of judging, the
interpretation/construction distinction is largely unhelpful. This
is largely because the discourse about the nature of the
distinction (however one defines it) is shaped and constrained by
normative impulses. This is not a qualitatively good or bad thing;
simply a reality.
Let’s take the idea of “recovering the linguistic meaning (or
semantic content) of a legal text.” For purposes of the
distinction, the linguistic meaning is the original public meaning

27. See id. at 11–12.
28. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 4th ed. 2006).
29. This idea of the unattainable “true/factual” past is not new. See JOHN LEWIS
GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY 3 (2002) (“But the past . . . is something we can
never have. For by the time we’ve become aware of what has happened it’s already
inaccessible to us: we cannot relive, retrieve, or rerun it as we might some laboratory
experiment or computer simulation. We can only represent it.”).
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of the legal text. The focus on original public meaning rather
than on original intent is one of the leading characteristics of the
30
“New Originalist” movement. Original intent theory holds that
interpretation of a particular legal text is (or should be)
consistent with what the author (or ratifier) meant the provision
31
to mean. In other words, original intent theory is primarily
concerned with the subjective intent of the person who drafted
(or ratified) the particular legal text. Original public meaning
attempts to discover what the generation that drafted, ratified,
32
or amended a constitutional provision understood it to mean.
While this sounds like something that can be discovered, like
excavating an historical artifact, presentism bars full discovery of
the original public meaning because present-day ideas and
perspectives cannot help but be anachronistically introduced
33
into depictions or interpretations of the past.

30. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 10, at 87–152; Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
31. Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1986) (“The standard of interpretation
applied by the judiciary must focus on the text and the drafter’s original intent.”); see
also, e.g., Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 774
(1987) (calling for “a jurisprudence based on the intent of the drafters”). But see
WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 36 (discussing “ratifying intent”).
32. But see Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 7, at 295–311 (offering a
variation on ‘new originalism’ that uses a ‘text-plus’ method to expand the understanding
of original public meaning to include the original generation’s understanding of the text
plus their understanding of the original principle the text was meant to serve); Balkin,
Constitutional Redemption, supra note 7.
33. Historians and legal scholars have both discussed the difficulties of presentism
and questioned the ability to make legitimate connections between the past and present,
see, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 181–84
(1996); MICHAEL KAMMEN, SELVAGES AND BIASES: THE FABRIC OF HISTORY IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 116–17 (1987) (observing that in the mid-twentieth century
professional historians shifted their focus from a search for a “usable past” to the
“‘pastness of the past,’ which means to accept the past on its own terms rather than to
transmogrify it into our own contemporary frame of reference”); PETER NOVICK, THAT
NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
PROFESSION 12, 99 (1988); Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 37 (1998) (“History, or at least history written according to the
conventions of late twentieth century professional historians, with an emphasis on the
ways in which the past differed from the present—history as an account of the pastness of
the past, as the standard expression goes—enormously complicates the task of legal
argument.”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 176 (2006); Jonathan D. Martin, Note,
Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert Historical Testimony in Federal Courts, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1526 (2003) (Originalist history fails “to understand the past on its
own terms and maintain a respect for its integrity”) (quoting Richard B. Bernstein,
Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1987)); .
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Aside from distorting original public meaning with presentday values and perceptions and selectively using the historical
evidence at their disposal, those who employ history as an aid to
constitutional interpretation also impose presentist teleology on
the history of the United States Constitution itself. Indeed, there
is the tendency to approach the history of the Constitution as
one of linear progress. The history of the Constitution is
typically articulated as one of steady progress toward a more
desirable democratic order. And this progression typically
presents itself as a continuous development from past to present,
with each step bringing us closer to the dream of civil rights and
34
liberties first expressed by our Founding Fathers. Among the
various fictions surrounding the Constitution, this one may be
the most pervasive and accepted, as well as the most difficult to
reconcile with the actual historical record. I suggest, then, that a
singular “true” original public meaning cannot be entirely based
on historical fact, because although we may know something
about the types of reasons and types of understandings some of
the original generation may have held about a particular
constitutional provision, it is impossible to gather evidence from
all or even most of the people who comprised the original
generation. Aside from the fact that such evidence is limited to
the view of elite actors, we still need to be mindful of problems
with verifying the motives underlying the evidence that we can
35
gather, such as diaries, notes, letters, minutes, etc. Because of
the inability to find and compile everything they need to tell
their story, historians typically fill in gaps in evidence; as LaRue
notes, people “build bridges between facts to interpret human
36
conduct.” In this regard, the search for “original public
meaning”—no less than the search for “original intent”—is
likely to yield an incomplete and/or flawed understanding of the
text.

34. See, STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY
166 (1996). For a discussion of how this reading of the present into the past
colors constitutional argument see generally, DAVID HACKETT FISHER, HISTORIANS’
FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970); G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815–1835 (1991); Saul Cornell,
Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional Constitutional History: Anti-Federalists, the Bill
of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 LAW AND HIST. REV. 1
(1994).
35. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) (discussing the
controversy over whether it is proper to use historical evidence from notes of the
Constitutional Convention to interpret the original meaning of constitutional provisions).
36. LARUE, supra note 23, at 20.
TO POLITICS,
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For these reasons, any “discovery” of original public
meaning can at best be an interpretation composed of various
pieces of evidence, i.e., a narrative construction. This narrative
construction is not necessarily a bad thing, so long as we
recognize that gap-filling and selectively emphasizing certain
facts is part of the process. Therefore, discourse on any of the
various definitions of “interpretation” and “construction,”
whether stated as broadly theoretical or intensely empirical,
sooner or later slips into a fictional narrative mode. The point of
identifying the distinction as a fiction is not to destroy it, but to
consider how this fictive distinction may still be relevant.
II. THE UTILITY OF THE
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION FICTION
For some time now, the debate over originalist versus
nonoriginalist constitutional interpretative methodology has
been so polarized that audiences of both camps find it hard to
take a fresh position or to reach those on one or the other side.
The interpretation/construction distinction, however, offers a
means of escaping this entrenchment while still preserving the
essence of the fundamental argument. What the distinction
creates is a safer, less hostile forum, as well as a new vocabulary,
for a dialogue among two combatants—originalists and
nonoriginalists—who otherwise talk past each other.
How does the interpretation/construction distinction offer a
means of escaping this entrenchment if it preserves the essence
of the fundamental argument; wouldn’t the distinction just set up
the same old arguments in new language? Fair questions. In
short, the strength of the distinction is in its ability to shift the
focus of the debate about the constitutional issue from people:
originalists/nonoriginalists,
to
activities:
interpretation/
construction. This allows evaluation of and debate on the merits
of the offered justification for what the original public meaning
is (for a particular issue) and whether or not the construction to
accommodate modern circumstance is an acceptable extrapolation of that original public meaning. It focuses on process
and justification rather than on retreat into political ideology:
(i.e., “That opinion was written by a conservative justice and as a
political liberal, I’m against it.”).
In the safer space created by the interpretation/construction
debate—and with the shared vocabulary of that debate, the
impasse between originalists and nonoriginalists can be
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transcended and the discussion edged forward. The new, lesscharged environment allows the methodological camps to talk to
not at each other. Rather than each camp becoming more
cemented into familiar points of disagreement, the distinction
can be used to frame a critical process that unfolds pursuant to a
mutually accepted sequence of tasks. It begins with a close
analysis of the text, followed by extended historical-contextual
research, and then culminates in the legal application of the
particular constitutional provision that best suits the
constitutional principle being served and protected in light of
contemporary circumstances. The distinction then can be used to
explain how federal courts can maintain alternative
constitutional constructions that are nevertheless valid and
binding.
Additionally, the distinction can be used to explain and,
depending on the circumstances, justify or criticize the manner in
which those judicial constitutional constructions create informal
constitutional change. Keep in mind that just because originalists
and nonoriginalists may (at least to some degree) accept a
similar
analytical
process
based
on
the
interpretation/construction distinction, this does not mean that
the outcome of the analysis will always be the same.
Acknowledging that the distinction, while providing a common
process, is a fiction allows us to accept that any one
interpretation being offered is just that, “an” interpretation
(which alone is no vice) and not “the” interpretation (which
tends either to hyper-polarize the debate or terminate it
altogether). We can be skeptical, we can recognize what the
interpreter has done—constructed a fiction to support his or her
interpretation—and we can ask if there might be better
interpretations that could be offered, but we would be wrong to
argue that there is an interpretive method that does not rely to
some extent on the mechanics and devices of fiction. To take
such a position would be tantamount to claiming omniscience on
all matters related to American social history, economic
development, political evolution, and linguistic change—a tall
order.
The interpretation/construction distinction creates a safe
haven—a
middle
ground—between
originalism
and
nonoriginalism where constitutional debate and criticism can
hover between wholly originalist and wholly nonoriginalist
theories. Moreover, the tension between originalism and
nonoriginalism, as captured in the slightly tamer debate over
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interpretation and construction, is fundamentally necessary to
our constitutional system and the law courts that give sustenance
to that system. In their pure forms (i.e., strong, hard, or
extreme), neither originalism nor nonoriginalism provides a
functional model for judges or, for that matter, non-judicial
actors in the political arena. The one creates absurd results when
confronted with distinctly modern constitutional problems, while
the other results in a kind of constitutional drift, where the
actual text of the underlying document loses its governing power
and becomes a mere museum piece without force of law.
The reality is that originalism cannot wholly survive without
accepting a certain degree of nonoriginalism, and vice-versa.
Consider a discussion between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer
that took place on an episode of “America and the Courts” on
37
C-SPAN. The Justices traded their views on the interpretation
of the Constitution in a changing society. The discussion turned,
inevitably, to the constitutional interpretive methodologies that
each used to inform how they reached decisions. Justice Scalia
advocated textualism and originalism while Justice Breyer
advocated a nonoriginalist approach, which considered the plain
meaning of the text, but also included other modalities of
interpretation such as historical practice, structure of the
38
Constitution, etc. In discussing his judicial philosophy, Justice
Breyer explained that he believed that ambiguous constitutional
provisions (like the Equal Protection Clause, freedom of speech,
or cruel and unusual punishment) represent standards of
conduct. And that instead of enacting specific conditions, the
eighteenth century drafters of the Constitution enacted values.
The difficult question for judges, he continued, becomes not only
where you draw the line today but how to do this in a way that
has objective appeal. For Breyer, he said this meant looking at
the principle and basic value underlying the ambiguous
constitutional provision and testing that value against modern
circumstances.
Justice Scalia attempted to offer a different position. He
claimed that although the equal protection of the laws could not
be expanded to include things like same-sex marriage, a judge or
37. On an episode of “America and the Courts” aired on C-SPAN on October 31,
2009, Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia spoke about their judicial philosophies
and their views on the interpretation of the Constitution at the University of Arizona
School of Law.
38. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12–13; BOBBITT, FATE, supra
note 18.
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justice did have to calculate the trajectory of the original
provisions when talking about new phenomenon. The moderator
then asked Justice Scalia about his analysis in one of those
39
trajectory cases: Kyllo v. United States. Kyllo was a Fourth
Amendment case that dealt with whether the use of thermal
technology from outside a residence to measure elevated
temperatures inside the residence (a sign pointing to the
probability that marijuana was growing within the house) was an
unreasonable search. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Scalia, held that the use of thermal imaging was a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment which required a
warrant. The moderator asked Justice Scalia to explain how he
arrived at his decision.
Scalia’s explanation of his analytical process was rather
interesting. Justice Scalia said that he arrived at his decision by
regarding what the Framers would have thought about a
technique that essentially intrudes into the house without the
consent of the homeowner to find out what is going on inside.
He claimed that he started with the plain meaning of the text of
the Amendment. When the moderator pointed out that the plain
meaning of the text did not address thermal technology (and
could not have done so, given that it was drafted in 1791), Scalia
elaborated. Justice Scalia said that he looked at what type of
searches and seizures were unlawful at the time, which led him
to conclude that the underlying value protected by the Fourth
Amendment was freedom from unreasonable intrusion in the
home. Next, he considered where the new thermal technology
fell within that context. Given that the new technology was
similar in kind to the concrete intrusions the Fourth Amendment
prohibited and served the underlying value of protecting against
home intrusion, the Court disapproved of its use without a
warrant. This prompted Justice Breyer to point out that in terms
of interpretive methodology he and Justice Scalia were talking
about the same thing: finding a value, principle, purpose, and
then applying modern day circumstances, to which Justice Scalia
responded by retreating to safer territory and repeating a
familiar slogan of extreme originalism—that a Justice should be
constrained by the interpretation of the original meaning of the
text.
This colloquy between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer
illustrates a couple of important points about the distinction
39. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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between interpretation and construction. First, it shows that
when judges are asked to explain how they actually work their
way through real-life constitutional issues, they tend to focus
more on process, not theoretical purity, resulting in a less-heated
and more candid dialogue that does not immediately put the
other party into a hyper-defensive mode. Second, it shows that
the process of judging, at least in the constitutional law context,
almost always requires a hybrid approach, lest the issue being
litigated become lost in a parlor game among ideologues. What
you can start to appreciate in Kyllo is that the disagreement in
judicial philosophy is essentially one of degree not kind; that
while the difference is in the degrees of how much weight a
judge/justice places on the original conditions contained in the
text and how much weight she places on the underlying value,
the process is quite similar. Indeed, what one calls “looking for
what the Framers did” the other can call “looking for the
values.” What the distinction’s vocabulary permits is for these
two judicial decisionmakers to effectively agree on the process
by which a particular constitutional case is adjudicated while
preserving their right to disagree on the ultimate outcome of the
litigation—we have contained the tempest and yet benefitted
from the storm.
And just as originalism needs a solid dose of nonoriginalism
to be relevant, nonoriginalism would lapse into a kind of ruleless relativism if it did not accept the basic originalist premise
that the text of the Constitution is the necessary starting point
for a legitimate constitutional analysis. Indeed, in the late 1980s,
David Hoy and Larry Solum argued effectively that maintaining
the debate about constitutional interpretation based on a hard
line distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism was
ultimately unhelpful because any legitimate theory of American
constitutional interpretation had to take into account the actual
words and phrases of the Constitution, as well as the context in
40
which those words and phrases were written. In other words,
originalist interpretation is not the mere anachronistic practice
of applying 220 year-old language to modern problems. It is, on
the contrary, a necessary act in understanding what the
Constitution says and means and how it should be applied.
Originalism helps to maintain the constitutional text as a fixed
point of navigation, allowing judicial and non-judicial actors to
40. See David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/
Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 (1989).
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negotiate their way through the difficult, often unpredictable
waters of American civil life.
Nonoriginalism if unalloyed with originalism diminishes to
41
the point of disappearance the role of the Constitution’s text.
But however well-intentioned, a constitutional analysis
unconstrained by the text of the document leads to
42
“constitutional drift.” We forget what the words of the
Constitution actually say and instead rely on myths that
dangerously rephrase the text itself. Some of this happens
already. For example, many people believe the Constitution
expressly establishes a separation between church and state.
Imagine their surprise when confronted with the actual text of
43
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. While
a separation of church and state can be inferred from these two
provisions of the First Amendment, one is certainly not spelled
out with absolute clarity. Institutional convention and public
expectation require that constitutional debates stay within arm’s
reach of the text. Without some concrete tether to the text,
constitutional debate drifts away from the text into
44
constitutional “folk lore.” Without some level of connection to
41. This strong form of nonoriginalism was labeled “noninterpretivism.” See
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706
(1975). In his article, Grey characterized the two predominant forms of constitutional
interpretive methodology at the time as “interpretive,” which sees text and original
intent as constraints on judges, and “noninterpretive,” which sees the court as having an
“additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair
treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive
law in the written Constitution.” The noninterpretivist school accepted the view that
contemporary understandings could supplement and even supersede the original
meaning of the Constitution’s text. For literature representative of the interpretivist
school arguing that constitutional law is not only what can be drawn from the text, but is
also about enforcing values drawn from somewhere other than the document, see Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Paul Brest, Comment, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (1985); Ira C. Lupu,
Constitutional Theory and the Search for a Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 579,
583 (1983).
42. The noninterpretivism debate, as originally constructed thirty years ago, is in
essence over today. Indeed, by 1984, Thomas Grey replaced the term “interpretivist”
with “textualist” noting that his original nomenclature was misleading because
“noninterprevists” did in fact interpret the law. The use of the term “textualist” Grey
claimed highlighted the central feature of the relevant disagreement between the two
camps—the role of the written text in constitutional interpretation. Thomas C. Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
44. Few, if any, constitutional theorists deny the binding character of the
constitutional text itself. And while disagreement remains on how much emphasis to
place on the text versus other sources, few place exclusive reliance on extratextual
sources of constitutional justification.
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or consideration of the text, the distance between the
Constitution as law and the Constitution as politics becomes too
great and the tether snaps.
The interpretation/construction distinction, however,
accepts a fair amount of hybridizing or mixing of originalist and
nonoriginalist methods. Indeed, it insists on it as a necessary
aspect of both judicial and political action. By focusing on the
actual practice of constitutional application, the interpretation/
construction framework allows for discussion of meaningful
differences, some quite nuanced between originalists and
nonoriginalists (or, if you prefer, among the various strains of
originalism—“weak” to “strong”), without the conversation
devolving into a pitched and endless theoretical battle. In so
doing, the distinction replaces a taxonomy that has outlived its
usefulness.
III. THE INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION FICTION
PROVIDES A NEW FORUM AND A NEW LANGUAGE
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
As alluded to above, the distinction between interpretation
and construction, despite being fictional, adds a practical
component to the debate between originalism and
nonoriginalism, and as a result, moves the discussion out of one
focused on pure theory to one that includes a discussion about
judicial activity. The distinction sets up something of a two-step
process: the first step argues for a particular original public
meaning and the second step implements that original public
meaning by constructing a judicial rule that can be applied to the
case at hand (and likely future cases) in a way that both serves
the current need of the litigants and avoids anachronism.
So why is that useful? It’s useful because the entire
enterprise of constitutional interpretation can now take into
account the actual practice of constitutional application, not just
the theories constitutional scholars expound in law review
articles. It embraces the “is” side of the law, not just the “ought
to” side. When discussing the legitimacy or, more accurately, the
correctness of a judicial application of a constitutional provision,
we should at some point consider what the judge/justice actually
does. What we learn from evaluating judicial activity tells us
something important about how the constitutional provision is
being interpreted. By considering the practical realities of
judicial activity, we frame the debate in a more meaningful
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structure because it does not limit the discussion to what one
thinks the law “ought” to be.
On a more general level, theoretical debates, when infused
with a bit of practical reality, tend to be more grounded and,
ultimately, productive. This is probably the greatest benefit
generated by the interpretation/construction distinction. It
removes the entire discussion of constitutional application out of
the rarified air of abstract theory to a place where mutual
understanding, based on shared experiences, might be reached.
Although a debate in a completely philosophical and conceptual
realm is interesting, there is little chance that a purely abstract
debate will produce significant movement one way or the other.
It is this possibility of movement—this hope for pushing the
debate forward to points of greater refinement—that gives the
debate over interpretation and construction its freshness and
importance. I think that’s what we may mean when we talk
about the distinction allowing us to transform but preserve the
debate in a way that permits us to continue to spin off benefits.
Indeed, the chances of spin-off benefits resulting from a
continued purely conceptual discussion are slim.
In addition to transcending purely abstract philosophical
debates the distinction may be useful in abandoning what one
45
scholar has called “constitutional clichés.” In his article,
Professor Barnett discusses the demise of constitutional catch
phrases such as “judicial activism, judicial restraint, strict
construction, Framer’s intent, and dead hand of the past,”
46
among others, into constitutional clichés. He states that while
these phrases may have meant something at one time, they are
now largely “devoid of substance” and “should be abandoned
47
even in casual conversation.” His central claim is that these
clichés “[allow] commentators to avoid substantive
constitutional argument in favor of a process-based analysis that
can be easily leveled in the absence of any expertise on the issue
raised by a particular case . . . . [And] they enable commentators
to criticize the Court or particular decisions without actually
48
having to know much about the Constitution itself.” The
advantage of the interpretation/construction distinction is that it
requires analysis of both process and substance. An analysis of
both aspects of the distinction: the substantive “what” of
45.
46.
47.
48.

Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493 (2008).
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
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interpretation and the procedural “how” of construction
requires that critiques of judicial decisions tackle more than the
proper role of the judiciary and deal in some way with the
mechanics of the legal reasoning in the decision itself.
Finally, by transforming but preserving the debate, we ward
against the hegemony of one American constitutional
interpretative theory. Although, as some have suggested, the
major differences in American constitutional theory in terms of
“originalism” and “nonoriginalism,” may be shrinking it is not
gone and the schism between the two is part of the American
culture of political debate and has largely defined the historically
extended tradition of constitutional argument in this country. In
a certain sense, this tradition of argument and debate provide a
means through which the American political community can
address, protect, and reassess changing political and social
priorities.
Ironically, this culture of law through argument and debate
is something that unites Americans as a political community, so
long as the conflict does not become too polarizing. American
writer E. L. Doctorow made this point in an essay he wrote in
1987, the bicentennial of the Philadelphia convention that
framed the U.S. Constitution:
[T]he great genius of the convention of 1787 . . . was its
community of discourse. The law it designed found character
from the means of its designing. Something arose from its
deliberations, however, contentious, and that was the
empowering act of composition given to people who know
what words mean and how they must be valued. Nobody told
anybody else to live it or leave it; nobody told anybody else to
go back where they came from; nobody suggested
disagreement was disloyalty; and nobody pulled a gun. Ideas,
difficult ideas, were articulated with language and disputed
with language and took their final fate, to be passed or
rejected, as language. . . . This is what we cherish and honor, a
document that gives us the means by which we may fearlessly
49
argue ourselves into clarity as a free and unified people.

So, the interpretation/construction distinction fosters the
discourse about the theoretical differences between originalism
and alternatives that accepts the idea of a common starting
ground (original public meaning and historical context) yet still
49. E. L. Doctorow, A Citizen Reads the Constitution, THE NATION, Feb. 21, 1987,
at 208–17, reprinted in E. L. DOCTOROW, JACK LONDON, HEMINGWAY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1977–1992, at 117–38 (1993).
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permits proponents of each to argue as to a particular point of
departure. Ultimately, this framework advances and encourages
our political culture of argument, permitting discussions and
disagreements about the theory of American constitutional
interpretation to continue to spin off benefits.
CONCLUSION
The academic debate about constitutional interpretation
can sometimes get trapped in the inaccessible areas of concept
and abstraction. It is a valuable exercise then to remind oneself
what the point of the discussion is all about. Ultimately, the
Constitution is a document that not only secures personal
liberty, but is also intended to sustain a workable government
indefinitely. The question that we must keep at the forefront of
any academic debate is this: How should a society committed to
the idea of democratic constitutionalism best organize and
understand itself? And the answer(s) to this question cannot be
solely theoretical. They must be practical too. For these answers
will define the role the Constitution will play in contemporary
American life.
What the interpretation/construction distinction provides is
a better forum for continuing the theoretical debate between
originalism and nonoriginalism, between text and context,
between those who view the looming presence of the Founding
Fathers as a necessary preventative against constitutional
entropy and those who consider those same Founding Fathers
elitists whose “dead hands” should no longer control the
outcome of modern civil problems. While there is no agreement
as to how one locates the line that separates interpretation from
construction, the distinction between the two activities, however
fictional, provides an argumentative space that seems to yield
positive results in terms of constitutional understanding. This is
likely because the distinction forces those on both sides of the
debate to adopt a new (and largely shared) vocabulary, a
different
mode
of
conversing.
That
is,
the
interpretation/construction distinction provides an alternative to
the terminology of the old framework, permitting scholars the
opportunity to conduct a more meaningful discussion about
constitutional interpretation and implementation. It also directs
our attention to one of the dominant sources of constitutional
development—judicial activity—while exposing the tensions
which exist between that activity and the more political modes of
constitutional development and application. The distinction also
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preserves the excellent work and hard-fought battles that have
brought constitutional theory to its present state. It edges the
starting point of the debate forward by recognizing that among
the family of interpretive theories they all share certain
methodological characteristics as well as a common claim to
legitimacy.
Finally, the distinction embraces the idea of law as a culture
of argument—something that is deeply rooted in the American
political psyche. Indeed, our true national pastime may not be
50
baseball, but arguing over what is and is not “constitutional.”
This, I think, is a good thing, as it keeps us in touch with the text
of the Constitution as much as it keeps us in touch with each
other. Americans may loathe politics to the point of not wanting
to vote in national and local elections, but they are not apathetic
when it comes to the Constitution. There is, I think, a healthy
distrust among most Americans for those who insist on
theoretical certitude or ideological purity. This explains, in my
opinion, why the debate over interpretation and construction
feels like an advance. It assumes the character of diplomacy and
negotiation, where the objective is first to identify common
ground and then to bargain hard on the remaining points of
disagreement.
Ultimately, the current debate over the interpretation/
construction distinction is healthy and useful, even if the line
between the two tasks is fictive and indiscernible in any practical
sense. By bringing the issue of constitutional meaning down
from the high clouds of theory (originalism versus
nonoriginalism) onto the firmer ground of judicial practice
(interpretation versus construction), we have at last begun to
focus on the Constitution as it governs and shapes real political
life in the United States.

50. Alexis de Tocqueville himself commented on the American preoccupation with
all things legal: “There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835).

